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Abstract 
Decoupling economic growth from emissions of green-house gases is a major challenge 
for global sustainability. This relationship, mediated by product composition and the state 
of technology, is however a complex one. In this paper we examine critically the notion 
of an Environmental Kuznets curve relating economic growth and emissions, and assess 
the role of technical change operating at lower levels of aggregation. With the example of 
a large, middle-income developing country, we show that long periods of economic 





Global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) have been accelerating in recent decades. 
According to the last report of the IPCC, during the period 1970 to 2004 global emissions 
have risen as the combined effect of global income growth (77%) and global population 
growth (69%), which have surpassed the general decrease in energy intensity of income 
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(-33%) and the practically null reduction in carbon intensity of energy (-2%) (Rogner, et 
al., 2007; see also Sun, 1999). However, since the year 2000 global emissions increased 
far more rapidly than the worst scenarios projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) (see for example Rogner et al., 2007, Raupach, et al., 2007). If 
the trend of the last 20 years’ continues, human GHG emissions would increase between 
40% and 60% from 2000 to 2050, which will very likely produce an increase of between 
2.5 and 4.5°C in the Earth’s mean temperature with respect to the year 2000 (Rogner, et 
al. 2007). Such apparently small changes in the mean global surface temperature will 
provoke profound and irreversible changes in climate patterns. Even though there is no 
scientific consensus, many observers argue that even an additional 2°C increase in global 
temperature (with respect to the 2000 level) is enough to trigger irreversible changes in 
the fundamental physical conditions of the biosphere.1 For avoiding dangerous warming 
levels, global emissions must be reduced between 60% and 80% by 2050, with respect to 
2000 emissions, peaking between 2000 and 2015 (IPCC, Fourth Assessment Report, 
WGIII, 2007). 
 
Recent emissions’ growth has been driven by expansion of the world economy combined 
with the reversal of earlier declining trends in the energy intensity of economic activity 
and the carbon intensity of energy. One of the reasons behind these trends is that at the 
same time that GHG emissions from the developed world have continued to grow, the 
impact from developing countries is on the rise. Developing countries are responsible of 
23% of global cumulative emissions since 1750 (Raupach, et al., 2007; Hansen, et al., 
2007), but their share in global emissions is large and growing (up to 70% of emissions 
growth in 2004). 
 
According to the Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis (EKCH), which we discuss 
in the following section, it is plausible to expect that under certain conditions the 
emission intensity of individual economies would start declining after reaching certain 
                                                
1 See on this point Lenton et al (2008). The European Union definition of dangerous global surface 
temperature increase is 2°C with respect to the year 2000. Hansen et al. (2008) argue that a 1°C increase 
above 2000 levels would already constitute dangerous human interference with climate. 
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level income. Moreover, if international technology transfer receives effective support, 
technological leap-frogging could allow developing countries to reach that level earlier 
on. Assuming that both mechanisms work, the probability of keeping GHG concentration 
levels below the line of dangerous climate change would then depend on the ability of all 
major economies to reach in a coordinated way their respective emissions-turning-point 
income levels and start reducing their absolute emissions before reaching dangerous 
levels of GHG concentrations. In other words, the spreading of economic growth would 
make things worst before they get better, but they would eventually get better. As a 
corollary, the hypothesis reinforces the notion that a GHG mitigation strategy is 
secondary to economic growth. 
 
Prospects for this type of worldwide adjustment driven by economic growth are obscured 
by the relative irreversibility of both economic dynamics and their environmental impact. 
First, the physical processes resulting from GHG emissions entail autonomous feedback 
with long-term consequences; second, many economic choices relevant for climate 
change have such long-lasting effects that they can be treated as irreversible 
(Schmalensee, 1998). As suggested by recent trends, the pervasiveness of high-carbon 
energy technologies has offset energy efficiency gains. The surge of GHG emissions in 
large developing economies like China and India reflects the extent to which declining 
energy intensities have been offset by increasing carbon intensities, due to the 
acceleration of coal-based electricity generation and a rapidly growing transport sector 
fueled by oil (Rogner, et al., 2007). These examples illustrate the rigidities posed by 
technological inertia even in the presence of fast economic growth. Current prospects of 
global economic downturn only make this worst. For if growth is not a sufficient 
condition for reducing the carbon content of energy, it still remains a necessary condition 
for keeping emissions low by means of energy efficieny gains. Slow growth within a 
high-carbon, energy-intensive system will most probably yield a steady contribution to 
GHG accumulation, just as a running engine in a traffic jam. 
 
This paper examines the patterns of GHG emissions in Mexico as an example of a large, 
middle-income developing country experiencing low growth rates. In the first section, it 
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reviews the literature on the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis (EKCH) 
as applied to the relationship between economic growth and GHG emissions. In section 
2, we describe Mexico’s CO2 emission’s historical path and its constituent factors. In 
section 3, trends and features of energy intensity at the sector level are analyzed and 
explained. Section 4 focuses on emissions derived from energy use in the energy-
producing and industrial sectors, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. EKC and GHG emission paths 
 
The relationship between economic growth and GHG emissions has been examined by 
relying on the Environmental Kusnetz Curve hypothesis (Holtz-Eakin and Selden, 1992; 
Moomaw and Tullis, 1994; Cole et al., 1997; Moomaw and Unruh, 1997 and 1998; 
Schmalensee et al. 1998; de Bruyn et al., 1998; Sun, 1999; Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh, 
2001; Harbaugh, et al. 2002; Matrínez-Zarzoso and Bengochea-Morancho, 2004). It was 
originally formulated by Grossman and Krueger (1991) in the context of the discussion 
on trade and the environment (see also Grossman and Krueger, 1995). The 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis predicts (or, more rigourosly, assumes) 
an inverted U-shaped curve relating environmental impact to economic growth. Simply 
stated, it asserts that the environmental impact of economic growth increases with income 
up to a maximum level and then declines afterwards. As societies satisfy their basic 
needs, and education and health standards rise, they become more willing to spend parts 
of their income in protecting the environment. At the same time, and due to technological 
leapfrogging and imitation, developing countries should exhibit “lower” EKC curves and 
smaller income thresholds (Dasgupta, et al. 2003). 
 
As argued in Dasgupta et al (2003), an environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) can result as 
income increases in a society if four conditions are satisfied: 1) the marginal utility of 
consumption is constant or falling; 2) the dis-utility of pollution is rising; 3) the marginal 
damage of pollution is rising; and 4) the marginal cost of abating pollution is rising. 
Applications of this framework have focused on estimating income levels at which 
“turning points” for different pollutants and other indicators of environmental impact take 
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place. Evidence on such a relationship has been argued, perhaps far too quickly, for 
promoting trade and investment liberalization (see Baker, 2003). 
 
Despite punctual warnings by the original authors, the hypothesis has sometimes been 
argued to encompass income effects on aggregated environmental impact. This, however, 
would imply building a consistent measure of multidimensional environmental impact, an 
obstacle that impedes consistent testing of the hypothesis in general (Nadal, 2006). There 
are also problems with aggregation at the spatial level: environmental damage could be 
curbing at some location while increasing somewhere else, due to a “passing the buck” 
mechanism (Rothman, 1998). But the main drawback in the EKC hypothesis is the 
implicit assumption that environmental damage is not cumulative and their impact is 
reversible (Tisdell, 2001). Rising temperatures and GHG concentration are subjected to 
strong positive-feedback effects, and may not decline after a critical pollution threshold is 
exceeded. In such cases, the marginal damage of pollution would increase autonomously 
after some value, independently of economic growth. Finally, even if the hypothesis 
holds, it is not granted that there would be enough “atmospheric space” for all countries 
to curbe their emissions before producing irreversible climate damage. 
 
There is no empirical evidence supporting an EKC for GHG emissions. Both Moomaw 
and Tullis (1994) and Schmalensee et al. (1998) found that CO2 rises cross-sectionally 
with income per capita without strong evidence of a turning point. Both studies show as 
well that, even when some countries' trajectories present an inverted-U shape, results are 
highly heterogeneous. Individual country heterogeneity has been confirmed in de Bruyn, 
van den Bergh and Opschoor (1998), Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2001), Roca and 
Alcantara (2001), Friedl and Getzner (2002), and Huang et al. (2008). More specifically, 
Cole et al (1997) found that “EKCs exist only for local air pollutants, whilst indicators 
with a more global, or indirect, environmental impact either increase monotonically with 
income or else have high turning points with large standard errors.” The encompassing 
review by Stern (1998) noted that the evidence on an inverted-U relationship between 
emissions and growth applies only to a small group of measures of environmental impact 
,like suspended particles and SO2. In general, thorough panel data analysis has shown that 
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rebound effects and N-shaped relationships are ubiquitous (Moomaw and Unruh, 1997; 
Martínez-Zarzoso and Bengochea-Morancho, 2004), and that good “curve fitting” does 
not necessarily imply future behaviour (Moomaw and Unruh, 1997). 
 
Despite its deterministic flavour, it is nowhere implied in the EKC hypothesis that a 
reduction of environmental impact would be an automatic consequence of growth (Arrow 
et. al. 1995). Moomaw and Unruh (1998) argue that while the notion that economic 
growth proceeds by stages is a key notion behind EKC, it is not certain that it “is a 
deterministic process that all countries must pass through” (p. 222). But in practice, the 
EKC approach normally compares countries with very different resource endowments, 
different income levels, and different patterns of product-technology specialization 
relying on the key assumption of income determinism. In contrast, Moomaw and Unruh 
use a simple non-linear dynamic analysis to track down the evidence on the transition to 
lower levels of CO2 per capita in a set of countries. Their findings show that “these 
transitions occur over a broad range of income levels and, somewhat surprisingly, the 
transitions are found to occur abruptly and co-temporally. They do not appear to be the 
result of endogenous changes in income growth, but instead result from rapid, co-
temporal historical events and responses to external shocks.” Trajectories of CO2 
emissions can thus be better described as “punctuated equilibria,” rather than smooth, 
continuous change. To the light of current trends in GHG emissions, this conclusion is 
actually more optimistic that the EKC, and can be handed out as an evidence of both dis 
countinuous technical change and policy effectiveness. 
 
The literature on technological change provides explanations for the type of punctuated 
shifts and qualitative discontinuities like those suggested above. A critical issue is the 
distinction between incremental and radical technological change highlighted by 
Schumpeter (1947), as well as the notion of technological trajectories (Sahal, 1981; 
Rosenberg, 1982; Dosi, 1982). Under this nomenclature, it is plausible to associate 
energy efficiency improvements with relatively easier changes along a given 
technological trajectory, that is, with technical change derived from small step 
improvements in patterns of use in existing energy systems. Changing the carbon content 
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of energy, on the contrary, implies technological replacement for qualitatively different 
energy systems. The observed rigidity in the carbon content of energy at a global scale 
(Sun, 1999; Rogner, et al., 2007) is a result, of the high sunken costs of substituting 
highly interrelated systems and the resistance to adopt new energy sources even when 
they are cost-effective at the margin.  
 
In the presence of a carbon lock-in (Unruh, 2002), there is then a higher probability for 
individual economies to get trapped in low-growth traps with high carbon intensity. This 
conclusion has been suggested in an important study on the relationship between trade 
and the environment in Mexico (Gallagher, 2004). This author found that the hypothetical 
“turning point” of an emissions Kuznets curve for Mexico would be sliding away beyond 
the $5,000 1995-USD per capita threshold level found in cross-sectional studies. Trade 
liberalization would had been related to small income rise, while environmental 
degradation had advanced persistently. In the following we show how the interplay 
between components of GHG emissions in Mexico characterize a low-growth, high 
emissions trap. 
 
3. Mexico's path of CO2 emissions  
 
Mexico’s pattern of CO2 emissions from energy-use in the second half of the 20th century 
shows the footprint of industrialization and urbanization processes, an abrupt transition 
into emission-intensive uses of energy. According to Marland, et al. (2007) emissions 
intensity in per capita terms in this country progressed geometrically during the 20th 
century, doubling between 1950 and 1970 (from 0.3 to 0.58 tons of CO2 per habitant) and 
then doubling again between 1970 and 1982 (from 0.58 to 1.82 tons of CO2 per 
habitant).2 
 The increase in the volume of emissions in Mexico from 1970 surpassed those of 
                                                
2 The series by Marland, Boden, and Andres (2007) only account for a handful of GHG emissions’ sources. 
Sheinbaum, Rodríguez and Robles (1999) estimated much higher GHG emissions derived from energy use, 
but the growth trend in their series is slower. Despite the point-accuracy of this latter estimate, the time-
consistency of Marland et al (2007) makes it more suitable for analyzing the long-term trend. 
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population and income by a factor of two.3 Currently, Mexico contributes with 1.8% of 
the global GHG emissions, about 670 million tons of carbon equivalent every year. 
Examining the most recent trends show that energy and emission intensities decreased 
between 1989 and 2000 but then rebound in 2003 and 2004 (INE-SEMARNAT, 2006; 
SENER, 2006). If economic growth continues at current GDP growth rates, the level of 
emissions will double by 2030; but if more desirable growth rates were attained (5-6% a 
year) the volume of emissions could easily double in only 10 years (Masera and 
Sheinbaum, 2004). 
 
Graph 1 shows the historical trend of Mexico’s emissions factors as index numbers based 
in 1971. Decomposition of emissions factors follows the Kaya identity.4 As noted above, 
the volume of emissions doubled between 1971 and 1981, expressing the impact of the 
surge in crude oil production (following the discoveries of large oil-fields in 1976) on the 
fossil content of energy. During this period, an increase of 50% in income per capita 
increased the level of emissions by a factor close to 3. Population growth diminished 
steadily from average annual rates of 3.2% and 3.4% in the 1960's and 1970's to 2.2 and 
1.6 in the 1980's and 1990's. CO2 intensity of the energy mix remained more or less 
constant during the whole period, and income per capita remained stagnated from 1982 to 
1997, growing slowly afterwards, while energy intensity of the economy clearly curbed 
                                                
3 Though impressive, this volume increase was not strongly different from the increase in OECD countries 
with similar income levels in the early 1970’s. As a means of comparison, consider that the index for the 
volume of total emissions in 2004: Mexico, 385.6; Turkey, 497.6; Portugal, 400; Spain, 272; and 186 in 
Ireland (1971=100). 
4 This type of analysis has been used in IPCC studies and others for decomposing historical trends in 
emission’s factors (Kaya, 1990). It is based on the following identity: 
 
The Kaya identity entails a gross simplification of a complex factors. It aggregates data coming from highly 
heterogeneous phenomena, separates functions which pertain together, and conceals the nature of 
relationships among factors. For example, while there is undoubtedly a tight relationship between the 
carbon content of energy and energy efficiency, this relationship may not be constant in time due to a 
combination of strictly technical issues in the relative importance of activities. More straightforwardly, 
there may a clear relationship between energy efficiency and the scale of activity that escapes to be 
detected by this identity. This drawbacks should be kept present in interpreting the results. 
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about 1989. In consequence, the slightly curbing trend in total emissions is driven by 
diminishing energy intensity and, to a much smaller degree, by slower population and 
economic growth. This result matches those of Sun (1999), who showed that in most 
countries relative changes in energy intensity are much stronger than changes in the CO2 
intensity of primary energy, for the period 1971-1995. 
 
[insert Graph 1 about here] 
 
Mexico’s income trajectory oscillated back and forth within a narrow range during the 
period 1981-1999. However, during the economic downturn of the “lost decades,” the per 
capita emission rate in Mexico did not diminish proportionately. With fairly steady 
emission rates and population increasing, total emission volume accumulated at inertial 
speed while income per capita oscillated around a short range of income levels. As shown 
in Huang et al. (2008), the relative CO2 emissions’ path ex-socialist countries exhibits a 
“hockey-stick” shape, as a result of the economic collapse they experienced during the 
early 1990’s. Graph 2 shows that such a path occurred as well in Mexico during the crisis 
period 1982-1987, but then per capita emissions grew again when income recovered. 
 
[Graph 2 about here] 
 
Despite the strong structural adjustment that took place in Mexico during the "lost 
decades," it did not provide much improvement in terms of carbon intensity of economic 
activity. The growth in the total volume of annual emissions did slowed down, mainly 
driven by energy efficiency and the significant reduction in the pace of population 
growth. 
 
4. Energy Use 
 
Graph 3 shows the long-term trend of energy-intensity in Mexico. In general terms, this 
curve exhibits an inverted-U shape along the period 1965-2004, peaking in 1989 and with 
a weak rebound in the last 2 years of the series. Total energy consumption in the country 
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rise 6-fold in the period from 1,200 to 7,000 Petajoules. According to OECD data, 
primary energy supply per capita increased from 0.87 tones of oil equivalent (t.o.e.) a 
year in 1971 to 1.65 in 2005, just about the world’s average.5 
 
The decreasing trend in energy intensity from the 1990’s is result of at least four 
different, overlapping processes. First, between 1965 and 1981 the annual growth rate of 
energy consumption was slightly above that of GDP (7.6% and 6.7% a year, 
respectively), expressing the growing importance of energy-intensive industries that 
characterizes the industrialization process. Growth in both indicators stagnated during the 
eighties. Between 1989 and 2004, however, economic growth was much slower 
compared to previous decades (2.7% annual average), but energy demand grew even 
more slowly (1.8%). By the 1980’s most of the energy-intensive industries in mining, 
energy-producing and manufacturing had already been deployed. This means that energy-
demand per additional unit of output in the industrial sector would have started to fall, as 
activities with smaller energy-output ratios increased their share in new investments. 
Growth in the weight of the service sector may have also impacted negatively the average 
energy intensity of the whole economy. 
 
[Graph 3 about here] 
 
Second, after the 1982 crisis the economy shifted gears to a low-speed growth trajectory, 
compared to that of the previous decades. Growth of per capita GDP fell from 3.2 per 
cent a year between 1965 and 1982 to 0.7 per cent a year between 1982 and 2004, likely 
preventing the expansion of demand into more energy-intensive consumption patterns.6 
                                                
5 Energy use per capita is 7.91 t.o.e. (Tones of oil equivalent) in the US, 3.89 in the EU-25, 1.24 in China, 
1.11 in Brazil and 0.53 in India (OECD, 2007). 
6 Other Latin American countries experienced a similar trend. Between 1982 and 2004, per capita income 
growth (measured in constant US dollars PPP) in Argentina and Brazil reached 0.7 and 1.0 per cent a year 
respectively. This figure contrast strongly with countries that held similar wealth levels in the 1960’s like 
Ireland (6.3), Spain (3.3) and Portugal (3.1), and even more with emerging Asian economies like those of 
India (5.0), Singapore (5.6), South Korea (7.8) and China (11.5). Source: author’s calculations based on 
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2005. 
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Third, the economy’s liberalization process that took place since the 1980’s and a context 
of a constrained domestic demand both increased market competition and financial 
stringency. This triggered a multitude of structural and technical changes operating at 
plant and industry levels throughout the productive sector that plausibly induced, both 
directly and indirectly, rationalization of energy use. Aguayo and Gallagher (2005) 
showed that most of the reduction in energy intensity since 1989 can be accounted for by 
changes in the manufacturing sector, and that energy savings in this sector are a 
combined result of structural, technical, and trade effects. Finally, institutional efforts like 
the creation of the National Commission for Energy Savings (CONAE, for its name in 
Spanish) and the Fund for Electric Energy Saving (FIDE) were also instrumental in 
facilitating energy savings in firms and households. 
 
Graph 4 shows the trends in energy intensity for three different sectors during the same 
period. Relative energy use in the energy and industrial sectors is defined as the sectors' 
energy consumption per unit of that sector's GDP. Due to the pervasiveness of transport, 
its intensity is calculated as the sector’s energy use per unit of total GDP. 
 
[Graph 4 about here] 
 
By examining graph 4 we can differentiate two periods in the time-path of energy 
intensity at the sectoral level. First, in the period that runs from 1965 to the mid 1980’s, 
total energy intensity increased strongly as an effect of industrialization and urbanization, 
reflecting the incorporation of energy intensive technologies in both industry and 
transport. This trends are accompanied by a simultaneous increase in the energy 
efficiency in the energy producing sector. Plausibly, this last effect is a result of all sorts 
of economies in energy use, development and rationalization of the infrastructure of 
energy production and distribution, as well as of the faster introduction of more efficient 
technologies in energy sectors. Thus, energy efficiency in the energy producing sector 
supported the transition to an energy-intensive development pattern, buffering the impact 
on energy resources coming from other productive sectors. Upstream efficiency gains in 
the production of fuels and electricity held down average intensity of the economy, as 
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more energy-intensive activities were being integrated. In a second period, from the mid 
1980’s, efficiency gains in the energy sector show signs of exhaustion. Energy intensity 
in the industrial and transport sectors peaks in the mid 1980’s and early 1990’s 
respectively. Energy efficiency gains are stronger in industry than in the transport sector. 
Finally, the three sectors show a slight rebound effect from 2000 on, mainly due to 
economic stagnation. 
 
As a recent study showed, the transport sector in Mexico was the most energy intensive 
within OECD countries by 1996, about 50% more intensive than in the US and 100% 
compared to European countries like Germany (Gómez-Solares, et al, 2007, p. 20; the 
authors do not specify the units of comparison). However, the use of individual vehicles 
per 1,000 inhabitants is still much smaller than that of developed countries (op. cit., p. 
15). These figures suggest that energy-use by transport in the country can be expected to 
increase both relatively and absolutely in the longer term. In other words, without major 
shifts in regulation and technology, the likely trend of energy efficiency in the transport 
sector will not contribute positively to improve overall energy efficiency in Mexico. In 
what follows we examine more closely the contribution of the energy generation and 
industrial sectors.  
 
5. Sectoral emissions 
 
In order to account for “structural” differences between sectors we map the trends of the 
components of the Kaya equation for both energy producing and industry sectors. The 
following analysis is different from the one in section 1 in two aspects. First, it omits the 
population factor. With population growing at less that 2% in this short period of time, 
the population effect can plausibly be assumed as constant. Second, unlike the 
decomposition analysis of section 1, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in this section 
refer to CO2, CH4, and SO2 sectoral aggregates in units of CO2 equivalent.7 Data comes 
                                                
7 CO2 equivalents for CH4 and NO2 were set according to their potential warming up to 100 years, converted 
by equivalence factors of 21 and 310 respectively (see UNFCCC, 2004). 
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from the National Inventory of GHG Emissions (INE-SEMARNAT, 2002). The above-
mentioned caveats on this type of analysis must again be recalled. 
 
[Graph 5 about here] 
 
The calculation of emission factors for the energy sector includes both oil extraction and 
refining as electricity generation. According to Graph 5 above, GHG emissions in the 
energy-producing sector surged during the period, driven by expansion of scale without 
any significant reduction in either the carbon content of energy nor in the energy intensity 
of GDP. This occurred in spite of experienced important changes in technology and fuel-
mix that took place in electricity generation during the period (substituting combined 
cycle plants for conventional thermal generation) that should have translated into reduced 
carbon contents of fuels and increased energy efficiency. The share of major fuels in the 
energy sector as a whole changed substantially, with fuel-oil (combustóleo) decreasing 
from 53% to 33%, and natural gas and coal increasing from 29.9 to 49.6% and 5.0 to 
13.4% respectively (see SENER, 2007). However, according to GHG emission data, 
between 1990 and 2003 such changes yielded only minor reductions in emissions 
volumes. Direct emissions derived from energy consumption in the energy sector 
increased 49.8% between 1990 and 2003.8  Changes in the fuel mix would only have 
yielded a reduction of 2.79% in emission volumes. That is, if the fuel mix of 1990 had 
remained constant throughout the period, total emissions from energy use in the energy 
sector would have been about 3% higher. Considering electricity generation alone, direct 
emissions from energy use increased 75.14% between 1990 and 2003. Changes in the 
fuel mix in electricity generation would have barely saved 3.7% of electricity GHG 
emissions. 
 
Further technical change projected for the next decade in electricity generation will not 
                                                
8 Emission values were calculated simply by adding up the volume of fuel consumption scaled by the 
corresponding emission factors by type of fuel, as specified in IPCC (1996), Table 1-1, p. 1.13. Figures of 
energy consumption come from the National Inventory of Emissions of Greenhouse gases (INE, 2006). 
Due to lack of information, we omit additional differences among technologies using the same fuels. 
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provide significant direct reductions of emissions from changes in the fuel mix. 
According to planned investment of the Federal Commission of Electricity (CFE), the 
substitution of natural gas for fuel-oil will deepen between 2003 and 2013, changing their 
share in the industry’s fuel mix from 37.6 to 52.2% and 36.2 to 17.5%, while keeping the 
relative consumption of coal constant. These changes will generate around 5% of 
emission abatement at each level of emissions. Clearly, since our estimation misses 
additional differences in emission factors between specific technologies, the ongoing 
changes in the technological profile of electricity generation will provide additional 
emission reductions both directly and indirectly (through energy efficiency). But these 
additional changes will most likely be insufficient, given that gross electricity generation 
will increase 70% between 2003 and 2013, and that an additional 30 to 40% increase in 
supply will be needed by 2030.9 
 
It seems clear that the ongoing phase of technical change in electricity generation in 
Mexico, characterized by the penetration of natural gas as a main fuel is insufficient to 
draw the industry much closer to a level of emission stabilization by 2030. Of course, 
new combined cycle plants also deliver important emissions savings through increased 
generation efficiency. But these efficiency savings, coupled with minor changes in 
absolute emissions per unit of energy produced will be unable to offset the scale effect of 
growing energy supply. Change along the broader technological trajectory of GHG-
intensive energy sources will not flow towards lower-carbon patterns of energy  
generation. Without major efforts to adopt and deploy renewable energy sources, the 
energy sector will not be able to disengage growing emissions from economic growth in 
the next two or three decades in any significant way. 
 
There are other signs that the current technological trajectory is reaching maturity and 
decreasing efficiency gains. Graph 6 below shows the evolution of the physical and 
economic efficiency-ratio of the energy sector, measured respectively as the amount of 
energy consumed per unit of energy produced and as units of energy consumed per unit 
                                                
9 See IEA (2002) 
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of economic output (in turn, measured as the energy sector’s gross domestic product). 
Both ratios are expressed as index numbers with base in 1965, the first year available in 
the time series. 
 
[Graph 6 about here] 
 
The story behind the graph can be told, again, by differentiating two different periods. 
The first period starts in 1965 and ends between 1981-1983, and follows the predictable 
effects of the  process of deployment of a modern energy infrastructure based on oil and 
electricity and its development. Both measures of efficiency follow twin trajectories 
along a full cycle of energy-intensity growth and rationalization. Expansion and reduction 
of relative energy use expresses, first, an energy-consuming phase of construction of a 
modern energy base and, second, a subsequent phase when energy-saving opportunities 
are seized and learning by doing delivers improvement of  practices and technologies. 
While the effect of increasing international oil prices from 1973 on surely affects the 
economic efficiency ratio (as energy GDP includes a strong component of crude exports), 
this was firmly accompanied by increasing physical efficiency by about 30% from 1965, 
cutting relative energy use by a half from 1973-1983.  
 
The second period expresses important shifts in the structure of the energy use base, with 
diverging trends in the coefficients. Exhaustion of possibilities for improving physical 
efficiency coincides with stagnant levels of economic efficiency. High international 
prices of oil would have allowed Mexico to subsidized an increasingly inefficient pattern 
of exploitation and consumption of energy through surging crude-oil exports. This pattern 
is clearly not sustainable as the fossil-fuel reserves approach exhaustion: the country will 
be left out to grab whatever resources there are to finance heavy amounts of energy to be 
consumed in very inefficient ways, and without the “cash cow” of cheap crude exports. 
 
Graph 7 shows that the trends in GHG emissions and their factors in the industrial sector 
follow a significantly different, and moderately more optimistic, pattern of change. 
Emissions in the industrial sector include all CO2, CH4, and NO2 emissions derived from 
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energy use as well as emissions from industrial processes. The total volume of sectoral 
emissions in the industry sector increased around 18% between 1990 and 2000, with a 
10% decrease between that last year and 2003 due mainly to economic stagnation. 
Provided that the carbon content of the energy supply shows a slightly increasing trend, it 
seems clear that improvements in energy efficiency of about 30% during the period 
buffered the impact of activity growth (40 to 50%). 
 
[Graph 7 about here] 
 
The emissions’ trend of this sector is then one of a moderate increase in the GHG 
intensity of industrial activity. This trend expresses a technical pattern of development in 
which growing energy efficiency almost compensates the emissions' effect of economic 
growth, holding the carbon content of energy rather constant. Such a technical pattern 
suggests no major technological changes occurring at the level of the carbon intensity of 
core industrial production technologies. Unlike energy generation, the manufacturing 
sector seems to have been able to achieve significant energy savings through incremental 
technical change. But, was efficiency indeed a result of technical advance or the outcome 
of other factors like changes in the relative importance of energy-intensive industries? 
We can assert that technical factors dominated those derived form structural change 
during the period. 
 
[Graph 8 about here] 
 
Graph 8 shows that the evolution of energy efficiency at the sectoral level is a 
combination of both industry level efficiency gains and changes in the relative shares of 
individual industries. Total changes in energy intensity during the period 1988-2004 
would have a technology component of about 75%, and a scale component of about 20%. 
That is, about a fifth of the reduction of energy efficiency comes from more intensive 
industries loosing relative importance in favor of less energy intensive ones. A more 
detailed analysis shows that most of the scale or composition effect can be attributed to 
the collapse of the petrochemical industry in Mexico since the late eighties (confirming 
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the results by Aguayo and Gallagher, 2005). 
 
Finally, comparing these two latter graphs, it seems evident that efficiency gains are also 
closely related to cycles of investment and capacity expansion. Technical progress along 
the technological trajectory would tend to respond to the investment cycle and to market 
barriers to growth capacity, since the absorption of new core technologies depend on 
capital turnover rates. Accordingly, the slowing down of economic growth between the 
year 2000 and 2003 would have prevented Mexican industry from attaining subsequent 




We have argued that the EKC approach can be misleading, both theoretically and 
empirically, for assessing barriers to disengage emissions from economic growth. We 
showed that the trajectory of increasing GHG emissions in Mexico slowed down from 
1982 onwards, as a combined result of reduced population growth, economic stagnation, 
and moderate gains in energy efficiency. But unlike the experience of ex-socialist 
countries, growth stagnation during the two “lost decades” and the derived effort of 
structural adjustment did not yield a corresponding reduction of per capita GHG 
emissions. Lack of economic dynamism would have reduced opportunities for “shifting 
down” the EKC for GHG emissions. This shows that without major economic disruptions 
(that is, when income per capita contracts within small ranges) there is an inertial trend of 
environmental impact that is simply not reversible. Environmental effects simply tend to 
accumulate during periods of economic stagnation. 
 
Secondly, we argued that a distinction between incremental and radical technical change 
is necessary for understanding major shifts in the relationship between growth and GHG 
emissions. By breaking down the long term emission paths into different factors for 
different sectors in the Mexican economy, we showed what seems to be a general trend of 
exhausting opportunities for emissions-saving incremental technical change in the form 
of energy efficiency within the industrial, energy and transport sectors. Energy efficiency 
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gains in these sectors seem to have slowed down, reaching a level where further gains can 
only be attained through more profound technological and structural changes. On the 
other hand, radical technical change in the form of shifts in the carbon intensity cannot be 
detected at sectoral levels, despite evidence in individual industries. In particular, 
important changes in the technological base and fuel mixes of electricity generation have 
not delivered significant reductions in the sectoral level of emissions. 
 
Our findings for the case of Mexico, suggests that lack of economic dynamism would 
tend to reinforce the exploitation of high-carbon technological alternatives and delay the 
introduction of low-carbon technologies. Even when energy-saving effects can be 
attained in a slow-growth context, these type of incremental effects would tend to be 
small in capital intensive sectors, and will sooner or later lead to exhaustion. This poses 
important challenges for a successful strategy of mitigation at the international level. It 
implies that, for reducing the growing impact of developing countries on global 
emissions, fast growth is a necessary condition, but in no ways a sufficient one. This 
undoubtedly rises sever concerns about the likely climate effects of the ongoing 
economic downturn. 
 
Clearly, the technological rigidity of past decades is also permeated by higher relative 
costs of energy alternatives, the lack of certainty about the impacts of GHG emissions, 
and the legitimacy of GHG mitigation. Moreover, reduced opportunities to improve old 
systems also favor innovation. In other words, technological rigidities tend to soften out 
with the relative improvement of alternatives.  But it is important to recognize that there 
is large segments of economic activity are locked-in to high-carbon technical choices, 
and face large costs and weak opportunities for switching investment flows into low-
carbon energy technologies. The existing technological platform of many industries has 
to a large extent crystalized investments into high-carbon technological systems, 
generating multiple sources of lock-in and vested interests (including, but maybe not 
among the largest, the type of organizational inertia suggested by Unruh, 2000). 
 
Any mitigation strategy in Mexico will have to device solutions for relieving the existing 
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systemic barriers to reduce the carbon content of energy sources. This must emphatically 
include a shift in the current pattern of exploitation of fossil-energy, which is displaying 
signs of technological exhaustion. However, both radical change in fuel mixes and new 
opportunities for energy efficiency will depend on consolidating a new strategy for 
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